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INTRODUCTION
There’s n0 place for hyperbole

argument—though good
would increase

litigation

for

But Respondent’s prevailing party

appellate briefs.

in

Solomon Gepford—is downright

terrible for debtors generally.

and corresponding attorney fee awards against debtors

costs

for

It

two

reasons.

t0 preserve a right to a reasonable attorney fee,

First,

agencies to reject payments

made

to

judgment or formal settlement for the
t0

medical providers after

full

Gepford would require collection

suit is

ﬁled—litigating

amount owed. To show Why

LLC

compare what Medical Recovery Services,

that’s true,

all

it’s

cases t0

important

(“Medical Recovery”) did below, with

Gepford’s rule—embraced by the lower courts.
After the lawsuit began, Gepford paid

Recovery sought
t0 Gepford’s

in its complaint.

As soon

as Medical Recovery found out,

account and sought to advance the

adjudicate a reasonable attorney fee

Gepford asks the Court

from a payment

t0

and prejudgment

t0 treat the

payment

all,

so

it

cannot

wrong party—continuing

makes

things

credited the

more confusing

between

payment

interest.

to his medical provider as

will

hjs

somehow

different

medical provider didn’t

the prevailing

party. If the

be forced to reject payments to providers as

collection agencies

for debtors.

issues only adds t0 debtors’ potential attorney fee

who

it

amount Medical

the litigation until the debtor pays the collection

the court enters judgment. Differentiating

clients only

full

judgment so that the Court could

make Medical Recovery

Court adopts that position, collection agencies
t0 the

t0

litigation

Medical Recovery. Indeed, he asserts that paying

beneﬁt Medical Recovery at

made

medical provider the

his

And

liability.

requiring

and

their

more

Neither situation

medical provider

litigation

is

agency 0r

good

over these
for debtors,

often appear pro se.
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The second problem with Gepford’s argument has impacts

for prevailing

party analysis

generally—not just debt collection actions. Allowing courts t0 determine prevailing party status

based 0n

prelitigation

conduct 0r other facts extraneous to the relative success 0fthe parties on the

claims in the action would add greater expense and uncertainty to the prevailing party analysis.

Whether

the issue

is

prelitigation

settlement efforts, post litigation

0f

likelihood

collection,

0r

something else—parties would need discovery 0n any number of otherwise extraneous matters to
argue that a party received

little

value from

its

otherwise successful lawsuit.

For good reason, the Idaho Code, rules 0f
Gepford’s arguments. This Court should
shortly after

civil

procedure, and rules of evidence reject

Gepford’s payment

in full t0 his

medical provider

Medical Recovery sued, together with the favorable prejudgment

interest decision,

afforded Medical Recovery everything

it

too.

sought. Thus, Medical

Recovery was a

prevailing party

as a matter of law entitled t0 costs as a matter 0f right.

As
Code

a prevailing patty in a case “t0 recover 0n” an unpaid medical services contract, Idaho

§ 12-120(3) affords

Medical Recovery a reasonable attorney

fee.

contrary conﬂict with well-settled precedent and the plain text of Idaho

As a party

pursuing

its

Gepford’s argument t0 the

Code

§ 12-120(3).1

right t0 a reasonable attorney fee in the lawsuit, the

law also allows

Medical Recovery a reasonable attorney fee on appeal.

1

Medical Recovery intended to appeal only the entitlement to attorney’s fees under Idaho Code §
Medical Recovery did not intend t0 pursue on appeal entitlement to attorney’s fees

12-120(3).

under Idaho Code § 12-1200) but inadvertently included that issue 0n appeal before this Court.
Thus, whether Medical Recovery “waived” the issue 0r not is moot because it withdraws any claim
for attorney’s fees under § 12-120(1)

under

0n

thjs

appeal and seeks an award 0f attorney’s fees only

§ 12-120(3).
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ARGUMENT
MEDICAL RECOVERY PREVAILED AS AMATTER OF LAW.

I.

No one

likes the

debt collector. Despite Medical Recovery collecting

100% 0f the

debt and

prejudgment interest after suing, the District Court denied Medical Recovery prevailing party
status.

Even 0n matters 0f discretion,

the bounds of law.

“the

Clarke

v.

most favorable outcome

courts

must correctly apply the

Latimer, 165 Idaho

LLC

v.

437 P.3d

Nord Excavating

117 P.3d 130, 132—33 (2005) (reversing the

1,

be achieved,”

that could possﬂoly

0f law. Eighteen Mile Ranch,

1,

district

&

legal standard

6 (2018).

it is

When

and act Within

a party receives

a prevailing party as a matter

Paving, Ina, 141 Idaho 716, 718—19,

court’s prevailing

party determination and

remanding only for determination 0f the amount 0f the award).
“In baseball,

Id. at 719.

it is

said that a

When the defendant

walk

pays the

is

as good as a

plaintiff

hit.

The

latter,

of course

is

before answering the complaint,

affording immediate relief without the added expense 0f contested proceedings.

more

it’s

a

exciting.”

home run—

A later

award of

prejudgment interest just runs up the score. The District Court erredin denying Medical Recovery
prevailing party status

0n these

facts. Id. (holding

that

even

“less than

counterclaim together With successful defense 0f the plaintist

tremendous success” on a

claim

made

the defendant a

“prevailing party”).

Ignoring

this

straightforward

analysis,

the District

Court erred

when

it

credited four

arguments Gepford reiterates on appeal. (A) The court treated payment t0 Gepford’s medical
provider as though

2

The lower

courts

it

were

made

different

from what Medical Recovery sought. (R. 117—18, 334—3532

the alternative ﬁnding

that

reasonable fee would be $0 in attorney fees. (E.g.,

even

Medical Recovery prevailed, the
R. 117.) But the premise 0f the Court’s
if

0n the same analysis as its prevailing party determination. (E.g., R.
117.) This brief frames Medical Recovery’s arguments in terms 0f the lower courts error in
determining the prevailing party, but these arguments apply in equal measure to the alternative
alternative conclusion rested
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(B)

It

based

its

prevailing party analysis

117—18, 334—35.) (C)
prelitigation

It

on

denied fees due to Medical Recovery’s purported lack 0f diligence in

settlement efforts. (R. 117—18, 334—35.)

Magistrate Court’s ﬁnding

Recovery sued. (R.

conduct not the result 0f the action. (R.

prelitigation

that

And

(D)

it

clearly erred

Gepford lacked notice 0f the unpaid

bill

When

until

it

upheld the

Medical

after

116, 335.)

is no diﬂerence between paving the debt collector and paving the
medical provider. The District Court erred in holding otherwise in its

There

A.

prevailing party analvs is.

The Idaho

1.

Collection

Agency Act prohlbits

provider different from payment to

To deny Medical Recovery prevailing
to the

its

treating

medical

t0 the

debt collector.

party status, Gepford (and the District Court) point

$0 summary judgment award and the fact that Gepford paid

Medical Recovery—in response t0 the

payment

lawsuit.

his

medical provider—not

(R. 117—18, 334—35; Resp’t Br. at 11—12.) For

example, Gepford asserts that Medical Recovery “failed t0 recover a single cent as a result 0f the
lawsuit” because Gepford paid “the $416 to [hjs medical provider]”—n0t Medical Recovery.

(Resp’t Br. at 13—14.) “This

alone,”

Gepford

asserts, “precludes

[Medical Recovery] from

invoking prevailing party status.” (Resp’tBr. at 13—14.)

T0 be

a prevailing party under Gepford’s rule, Medical Recovery had to reject Gepford’s

payment because it was made
Inc.

v.

t0 the

wrong party and

insist

Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 236, 657 P.2d 1102, 1104

0n being paid

(Ct.

directly.

App. 1983) (”The

Bonanza Motors,

obligor

liable t0

is

the assignee if the funds assigned are subsequently paid to the assignor in Violation

assignment”). Not

conclusion that $0

so.

is

a reasonable fee. Ifthe Court reverses the prevailing party decision,

also reverse the alternative conclusion

remanded

that a reasonable fee

for a determination 0f a reasonable fee
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of the

is

$0.

And

it

should

the matter should be

based 0n the correct legal standard.

4

Debt

collectors

strictly regulates collection

LLC v.

The Idaho

are not ordinary assignees.

assignments. E.g.,1daho

Collection

Agency Act (“Act”)

Code §26-2221 etseq.;Med. Recovery Servs.,

Strawn, 156 Idaho 153, 156—59 &nn.1—4, 321 P.3d 703, 706—09 &nn.1—4 (2014) (noting

regulation

0n everything from fees collected

to the terms

0f prejudgment settlement agreements).

Unlike traditional assignees, Medical Recovery does “not step into the shoes of [its creditor
clients]”

When

it

receives an assignment for collection purposes. Strawn, 156 Idaho at 158, 321

P.3d at 708. Instead, a debt collection assignment authorizes the debt collector
the original creditor.

See

id.

Even When payments go

money. Purco Fleet Servs., Inc.

v.

Idaho State Dep

’t

t0

seek payment for

directly to collection agencies,

it’s

not their

0fFin., 140 Idaho 121, 126, 90 P.3d 346, 351

(2004) (“An assignee for collection holds any proceeds 0f the assigned claim in trust for the

assignor.”).

Every penny must g0

into a trust account.

See Idaho Code

§ 26-2233.

There’s even a

bonding requirement t0 ensure compliance. Id. § 26-2232.
Thjs

encompasses

“payments made

t0

moneys

“all

such creditor

clients

collected

.

..

on behalf 0f such

creditor

and

clients”

all

.”Id. § 26-2234(5) (emphasis added) (requiring written

statements of such collections “withjn thirty (30) days following the end of eachcalendar month”).
In other words, whether Gepford paid Medical Recovery 0r hjs medical provider—Medical

Recovery had a duty

To be

t0 account for the payment.

frank, if

Who

full

.

.

.

amount

t0 his provider,

misappropriate,

funds belonging to or held for another person,

It

its

would

also

breach

its

it’d

be committing a felony.

transfers, 0r converts to his

shall,

upon

own

Id. § 26-

use or beneﬁt,

conviction, be guilty 0f a felony

statutory duty t0 “deal openly, fairly,

collection efforts. Id. §

.

.

.

and honestly without deception

.”).

in”

26-2229A.
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id.

Medical Recovery had sought more than a $0 judgment on the principal

debt after Gepford paid the

2238(1) (“Any person

See

5

Thus, the Act cuts off Gepford’s argument that you can distinguish Medical Recovery from

its

creditor client.

708.

When its

Medical Recovery

collects for

its

client.

Strawn, 156 Idaho

at 158,

321 P.3d at

100% ofthe money Gepford owed, Medical Recovery prevails. The

client gets paid

$0 summary judgment recognizes the fact of

this

payment and advances

attorney fee and prejudgment interest phase, Without unnecessary

open, or honest to d0 otherwise. Idaho

Code

Court’s decision.

is

Medical Recovery

§

the proceedings to the

litigation.

It

wouldn’t be

fair,

26-2229A(1). The Court should reverse the District

a prevailing

party and the Court should

remand

for a

determination of a reasonable amount 0f attorney fees.

If debt collectors can’t count

2.

in the prevailing

and continue
attorney fee

payments

to the medical provider as success

party analysis, they Will be forced to reiect these payments

litigating

cases to iudgment—increasing

debtors’ potential

liability.

Despite the conflict with Idaho collection law, Gepford asks the Court t0 adopt Oklahoma’ s

OK 60, 427

P.3d 1050, 1052. Calnan

fours factually with this case: “shortly after [defendant] Calnan

was served a copy 0f [the

rule in

all

Tulsa AdjustmentBureau, Inc.

Calnan paid

collection action],

passage).)

The

Court rejected
prevailing

creditor sought

its

be

party status. See

debt in

full.”

at 105 1—52.

that creditors

“may reject

decision, in

seeka fee award.” Id.

Oklahoma’s

rule

is

good

creditors t0 reject tender of full

1051—52 (“[Creditor’s] claims

at

1052

Advising

attorney

fees—but

in this

its

the

0n

debt

Oklahoma Supreme

claim and deprived

creditors in future cases, the

[a debtor’s post litigation]

it

0f

Oklahoma

payment and seek to have

[creditors]

prevail—they will

n.7.

for Gepford, but

payment

is

(Resp’t Br. at 15—16 (quoting this

which case—should the

temble precedent for debtors generally.

It

forces

after suing to preserve their right t0 attorney fees. Id. at

case

may
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Id. at 1051.

summary judgment and

id.

same awarded by judicial
entitled to

Calnan,2018

claim—holding that the voluntary payment mooted

Supreme Court held
the

hjs

v.

very well be fee-bearing

.

.

.[,]

but [t]0 quaﬁfy as

6

such, the statute requires [creditor] t0 have prevailed 0n those fee-bearing claims, meaning that

[creditor]

for

must ﬁrst have obtained a judgment

in

its

favor 0n those claims before

it

could be eligible

an attorney—fee award”).
It’s

also

bad

providers—and any other industry

for medical

Without advance payment. Debtors have
for waiting until the creditor (or

Oklahoma’s

Fortunately,

precluded by
party[]’

[is]

this

its

little

incentive t0

pay

bills

goods 0r services

0n time When there’s n0 penalty

collection agent) ﬁles a lawsuit.

rule

is

barred by the Act. See supra Section I.A.1.

It’s

also

Court’s precedent on the prevailing party standard. In Oklahoma, “‘[p]revailing

a legal term of art” that “means the successful party

0n the merits 0f

that provides

his or

broader View. There

is

her claim.” Calnan,2018

OK 60,

n0 “judgment” requirement

t0

who has been awarded some

427 P.3d

at

1052

n.6.

be a prevailing party

relief

Idaho law takes a

in Idaho.

Indeed, the

Court doesn’t even have to render a merits decision 0n any claim t0 determine the prevailing party.
Idaho law directs courts t0 consider “the ﬁnal judgment 0r result 0fthe action

in relation t0 the

reliefsought by the respective parties.” I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). Whether settlement

payment, Idaho law recognizes that obtaining “the

relief sought”

status—not a speciﬁc disposition 0n the merits. E.g., Clarke

v.

is

3

it

Latimer, 165 Idaho

1,

‘result’

437 P.3d

1,

obtained by

(citation omitted)).3

See also Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 797 (2002)

may

voluntary

essential to prevailing party

6 (2018) (recognizing that “in the right case” the Court should “consider the

way 0f settlement”

01‘

be appropriate for the

trial court, in

(

“As noted by

the Idaho Court 0f Appeals,

the right case, t0 consider the ‘result’ obtained

0f a settlement reachedby the parties”); Jerry J. Joseph CL. U. Ins. Associates, Inc.

v.

by way

Vaught, 117

Idaho 555 (Ct. App. 1990) (afﬁrming decision 0f trial court that defendant was sole prevailing
when the defendant entered into settlement agreeing to all the substantive relief sought in the

party

plaintist

complaint);

Ladd

v.

determination that the plaintiff

Coats, 105 Idaho 250 (Ct. App. 1983) (afﬁrming

was the

prevailing party under a settlement

trial

court’s

agreement without the

having ﬁrst obtained a monetary judgment). Gepford notes that there was no settlement
agreement, claiming these cases d0 not apply. (Resp’t Br. at 14 n.2). But he doesn’t give any

plaintiff’s
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Thus, Idaho law rightly

payment once a lawsuit

debtor’s

rejects the

ﬁled.

is

Oklahoma

See Idaho Code

debt collector does not forfeit a right to attorney fees
the “relief sought

by

Debt

rule.

supra Section

§ 26-2229A(1);

when a

cannot “reject” a

collectors

I.A.1.

lawsuit motivates the debtor t0

A

pay

the [complaint].” I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). Indeed, this Court “emphasize[d] that

agencies under [Idaho Code]

26—2229A(4),

attorney fees are available

t0 debt

provided the fee sought

Within one 0f the ﬁve enumerated categories.” Strawn, 156 Idaho at

158, 321

P.3d

falls

credited

appropriately

payment 0f

it

wanted When Gepford paid

Gepford’s

post—ﬁling

The $0 summary

his provider.

impacting

payment, without

Medical

party status. The lower courts were not free to disregard Gepford’s

Recovery’s prevailing
voluntary

§

at 708.4

Medical Recovery got What
judgment

collection

the precise

amount Medical Recovery sought

in

its

complaint

or the

prejudgment interest also awarded.5 This Court should reverse the District Court and hold that

Medical Recovery prevailed as a matter of law.

Idaho law

B.

limits prevailing partv analysis t0 the

“action”—not prelitigation

conduct.

Gepford offers a second reason

t0

“incurred fees and costs only as a result of its

deny Medical Recovery prevailing

own

party status:

it

‘lack 0f diligence.” (Resp’t Br. at 12 (citing R.

reasoned analysis for that statement. Like a settlement, Gepford’s voluntary payment afforded
relief it sought without a court ruling 0n the merits. There is n0 logical
between Gepford’s payment and a settlement followed by an attorney fee motion.

Medical Recovery the
distinction
4

The

ﬁrst of the

statute.”

enumerated categories of appropriate fees are those “expressly authorized by

Idaho Code

§

26—2229A(4)(a). Idaho Code §12—120(3) provides attorney fees for

“to recover on” a “contract relating t0 the purchase 0r sale of

.

.

.

services

.

.

.

.” Id.;

suits

infra Section

II.
5

argument that Medical Recovery achieved nothing, Resp’t
11—12, improperly ignores the beneﬁt Gepford’s voluntary payment conferred on Medical

E.g., R. 117—18, 334—35. Gepford’s

Br. at

Recovery and
interest

was

the favorable

award of prejudgment

interest.

(R. 332 (identifying

prejudgment

included in the ﬁnal judgment below).)

APPELLANT’S AMENDED REPLY BRIEF
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Gepford argues that he “was not ‘afforded the opportunity t0 pay the

118)).

bill’

because [Medical

Recovery] ‘sent notices to an incorrect and non-existent address.”’ (Resp’t Br. at 12 (quoting R.
118).) This

argument

is

wrong, 0n both the law and the

Prevailing party status does not turn

1.

Rule 54(d)(1)(B) directs courts to consider

action”—not
prelitigation

Clarke

v.

facts.

conduct.

prelitigation

conduct

in

its

I.R.C.P.

“all

0n

prelitigation

conduct.

0f the issues and claims involved
(emphasis

54(d)(1)(B)

added).

in the

Considering

prevailing party analysis, the District Court erred “as a matter 0f law.”

Latimer, 165 Idaho

1,

5—6, 437 P.3d

5—6 (2018). Like the

1,

district

court in Clarke

v.

Latimer, here, the lower courts improperly analyzed facts outside the action to minimize the degree

0f success Medical Recovery obtained 0n
35.) In Clarke,

it

was the

plaintiff’s earlier

its

single claim for relief in the suit. (R.

judgment against a spouse that caused the court t0 ﬁnd

the plaintiff’s success “largely inconsequential.”

Clarke, 165 Idaho at

the “net effect” of the case before

earlier

judgment, the court

chairs

on the titanic”—with “no net gain or

felt

loss

by

on the

result

it

6,

was

437 P.3d

“like

at 6.

Given the

rearranging the deck

either party, except in attorney fees

t0 argue a rather esoteric legal issue.” Id. at 5—6. This

to focus

117—18, 334—

and costs

Court rejected that analysis, directing courts

0f the action—not prelitigation conduct 0r other facts outside the simple

analysis 0f Whether a party got

What

it

wanted as a result 0f the

lawsuit. Id. at 6.

Like Medical Recovery, “the Clarkes raised a single claim, presenting a single issue

there

were n0 counterclaims.”

Id.

The Clarkes had

receiving the “relief 0n their claim.”

ﬁling

81.)

its

See

id. at 4,

t0 slog all the

6.

way through

a bench

Medical Recovery got What

complaint—without the expense 0f contested proceedings on the merits.

it

trial

.

.

.;

before

wanted

after

(E.g., R.15, 32,

Rather than credit Medical Recovery’s success “in theaction,”I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) (emphasis

added),

the

lower courts faulted Medical Recovery for

APPELLANT’S AMENDED REPLY BRIEF
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its

purported

lack of prelitigation

9

“diligence.”

334—35.) But prelitigation

(See R. 117—18,

considerations required

by Rule 54(d)(1)(B).” Clarke, 165 Idaho

Sound policy supports the

2.

There’s good reason t0 prohlbit

who

assessment 0f

whether the

See

Titanic.”

pending

id.

litigation

rule’s focus

is

“esoteric” or the relief

at 6,

on the

“does not

437 P.3d

fall

Within

the

at 6.

action.

0f factors outside the straightforward

consideration

prevailed on the claims in the case.

legal issue

diligence

It

means judges

don’t have to decide

n0 more than “rearranging the deck chairs on the

Judges often lack important information about facts outside the record 0f the
over Which they preside: whether those facts are the existence or non-existence

0f a spouse’s separate property,

id.,

0r a party’s prelitigation

efforts t0 settle a dispute, (R.

117—

18, 334—35.).

Litigating these extra-record issues in attorney fee disputes

fees are often

much of the

relevant t0 deciding

judicial

fact ﬁnding

Who

relief sought in

prevailed,

an

would be a nightmare. Attorney
of the action are

action. If facts outside the result

you can expect

parties t0 conduct discovery

and request

on these matters. Because the only relevance of this material would be the

attorney fee issue, parties would need additional evidentiary hearings t0 prove the limited effect

0f the judgment 0r a party’s lack of prelitigation diligence. Idaho law

rightly rejects these inquiries,

directing courts to consider success“in the action.” I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B).

the District Court

and

and remand

for a decision

The Court should reverse

on the reasonable amount of Medical Recovery’s

fees

costs.

C.

Settle me nt eﬁ‘orts are

Not only

is

prelitigation

oﬂ limits

in the prevailing party analysis.

conduct generally out of bounds

denying fees because a party did not diligently work t0
Court’s precedent. Evidence

0f settlement negotiations

party—either t0 prove or disprove the

validity

APPELLANT’S AMENDED REPLY BRIEF
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or

in the prevailing

settle the dispute also

“is

not

party analysis,

conﬂicts with this

admissﬂﬂe—on behalf 0f any

amount of a disputed claim

.

.

.

.”

I.R.E. 408.

10

This Court gives Rule 408 a “broad, not narrow, interpretation in order t0 encourage settlement

SaintAlphonsus Diversiﬁed Care,

negotiations.”

Inc.

v.

MRI Assocs.,

LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 495,

224 P.3d 1068, 1084 (2009).

The Court has gone so

far as to

say that parties have “no duty

and courts have “n0 authority

settlement negotiations”

Idaho First Nat. Bank

[settlement] bargaining.”

824 P.2d 841, 851 (1991) (second
817, 836, 761 P.2d 1169,

alteration in original)

plaintiff attorney fees “in substantial part

conduct settlement negotiations
reversed holding “there
settlement negotiations,

Recover purportedly
18,

is

if

in

good

n0 authority
any

failed t0

.

.

.

upon

.” Id.

a

trial

a bright

is

line

engage Gepford

rule.

The

t0

conduct reasonable
for ‘bad faith’

sanctions

(quoting

Ross

v.

Ross

Coleman

v.

Coleman

C0., 114 Idaho

C0., the court

awarded

the

ﬁnding that the defense counsel had failed t0

court t0 insist upon, oversee, 0r second guess

Here, the lower courts denied fees because Medical
in

334—35.) That’s not allowed under the Ross

Thjs

.

114 Idaho at 836, 761 P.2d at 1188. This Court

faith.”

in

in

its

impose

.

Bliss Valley Foods, Ina, 121 Idaho 266, 276,

v.

1188 (1988). Indeed,

t0

.

“validity

adequate prelitigation settlement

efforts. (R.

117—

rule. Id.

or

amount 0f a disputed” attorney fee claim does

not turn 0n the contents 0r quality of settlement efforts. I.R.E. 408; Ross, 114 Idaho at 836, 761

P.2d at 1188. This
be destroyed

if

rule fosters a

parties

knew

degree 0f openness, candor, and Willingness to bargain that would

they might later be

litigating

Ifthe legislature intends t0 depart from this rule,

it

over settlement negotiations.

does so expressly. See Idaho Code § 12-

120(1) (allowing attorney fees in cases seeking $35,000 or less only

for

payment

fees

when

.

.

.

not less than ten (10) days before the

4836-9882—1301v3

there

is

commencement 0f the

“the defendant tender[s] to the plaintiff, prior to the

APPELLANT’S AMENDED REPLY BRIEF

if

a “written

action”

demand

and barring

commencement of the

action,

an

11

amount

(95%) of

at least equal to ninety-ﬁve

54(d)(1)(B) lacks

thjs

exception, as does Idaho

In sum, the rules 0f evidence,

the

Code

amount awarded

Court’s precedent, and sound policy reject Gepford’s

this

settlement efforts.

in prelitigation

0n the reasonable amount of

for decision

knewof the
Even

if

bill

from

his

and R. 130

for prelitigation

be considered, Gepford

debtor he claims t0 be. The record

the original bill

(showing Gepford’s address

Holliday”

the complaint

in

not the

and

bill

Gepford admits he received. (Compare R. 35
as 538 E. Holljday,

in the mail.

that

this

none were returned undeliverable».

116, R. 62 (identifying

litigation

an August

bill

was

the address

used

The Magistrate Court’s
notice

2,

was returned “No such number”).) None 0f the

(R. 130.)

lawsuit—refusing t0 pay the

ID 83201), with R. 135

Pocatello,

Medical Recovery’s testimony that

and was returned. (R.
that

(identifying

Medical Recovery’s business records as 538 E. Holliday, Pocatello,

(identifying

notices

was ﬁled

were returned

is

undisputed that Gepford got the

is

contrary conclusion rested exclusively on evidence that a post

West

Court and remand

medical provider (R. 116.) Medical Recovery sent every prelitigation notice

same address 0n

83201),

engage

fees.

settlement efforts could

Gepford’s address 0n the medical

ID

District

didn’t

’

the prelitigation

sympathetic, unknowing

to the

The Court should reverse the

it

substantial evide nce does not suppmt
ﬁnding that Medical Recovery was not diligent. Gepford
and would not pav until Medical Recovery sue d.

the lower courts

bill

because

status

Even if prelitigation conduct matte re d,

D.

original

Rule

§ 12-120(3).

argument that Medical Recovery can be denied prevailing party

Gepford

to the plaintiff”).

was

2016

sent t0 “538

letter sent after

pre-litigation

notices

What’s more, Gepford called Medical Recovery before the

and swearing

at

Medical Recovery’s employees. (See R. 138) So

he must have received the prelitigation notices Medical Recovery

sent.

When

asked about the

call

during the litigation, Gepford didn’t deny it—saying only he couldn’t remember. (Transcript R.

Vol.

I

at p. 22, Tr.

2428—25 (“Like

I said, I

do not

APPELLANT’S AMENDED REPLY BRIEF
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-- like

I said, I

cannot stand on

that,

Whether or

12

not

I

received a phone call 0r not from him.”).) Even after paying the

Shows

that

Gepford’s brieﬁng below

bill,

he rejected Medical Recovery’s attempt to settle—insisting on

litigating

the attorney

fee issue. (See R. 72.).

There’s no substantial,

competent evidence to support the lower courts’ ﬁnding

Medical Recovery exhﬂaited a “lack 0f diligence
13;

it

gets into the issue 0f

Medical

IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3) PROVIDES ATTORNEY FEES T0 THE PREVAILING PARTY
CASES T0 RECOVER 0N UNPAID SERVICE CONTRACTS.

§ 12-120(3).

this

services contract.

A.

case doesn’t involve a commercial transaction under Idaho Code

make

services contracts. E.g.,

new

like

legal

in

cases to recover 0n a

issue.

& Setzke,

Chtd.

v.

in

Henning, 116 Idaho

that section 12-120(3) “authorizes

.

.

.

in

cases t0 collect unpaid

199, 200,

774 P.2d 909,

a fee award” in a case to

services—without reference t0 the commercial transaction portion of the

statute, but concluding that

apro se

attorney does not qualify for fees); see also Calnan, 2018

1052 n.5 (quoting Oklahoma’s

at

mandatory

other states, has allowed fee shifting

Swanson

App. 1989) (holding

427 P.3d

is

Longstanding precedent authorizes attorney fees
collect 0n service contracts under § 12-120(3).

This isn’t a

For decades, Idaho

collect unpaid

clear that fee shifting

The Court should reafﬁrm this precedent and reverse.

cases t0

(Ct.

IN

(Resp’t Br. at 24—27.) But that doesn’t matter. Decades ofjudicial precedent and the

plain language 0f the statute

60,

if

(Resp’t Br. at

suit.”

diligence.

Gepford’s right that

910

matter prior to ﬁling

R. 117—18, 334—35.) The Court should reverse, even

Recovery’s
II.

in this

that

fee shifting

statute With

similar

OK

language t0

Idaho’s). 6

6

Idaho 857, 860, 727 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding (before
“commercial
transaction” language) that § 12—120 “mandates an award
enacted the

Cf. Spidell v. Jenkins, 111

the legislature

of attorney fees.

.

.to the prevailing party in a civil action brought t0

APPELLANT’S AMENDED REPLY BRIEF
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recover 0n anote”), abrogated

13

As

Without analyzing Whether the transaction had a commercial purpose.

v.

context—

recently as 2018, the Court has reafﬁrmed this rule in the medical services

Neumeier, 163 Idaho 504, 513 (2018) (“In

recover 0n a

bill

from a contract

arising

this

Med. Recovery Servs., LLC

case, [Medical Recovery] brought

for medical services. Thus,

Neumeier

its

action t0

entitled t0 fees

is

under section 12—120(3) as the prevailing party.”).

What’s more, the Idaho Court 0f Appeals analyzed and rejected Gepford’s argument

that

medical services contracts must involve a commercial transaction t0 qualify for attorney feesunder

Idaho Code

§ 12-120(3). In

Eriksen

v.

Blue Cross ofldaho Health Services, Ina, 116 Idaho 693,

695, 778 P.2d 815, 817 (Ct. App. 1989), the defendant argued “that the statute’s reference to

‘services’ [was] limited

by

the subsequent mention of a ‘commercial transaction.”’ Id.

The Court

disagreed. Applying the canons of “parity 0f construction” and avoiding “surplusage,” the Court

held “the Legislature put the term ‘commercial transaction” in

but to extend

its

coverage t0

non—commercial disputes.”
phrase “and

As
for

in

litigation

arising

Id. “Thjs intent

thirty

its

scope,

from commercial disputes as well as from certain

Id.

(emphasis

further evidenced below, both this Court

more than

not t0 narrow

evinced by the Legislature’s use 0f the conjunctive

is

any commercial transaction.”

this statute,

in original).

and the Court 0f Appeals have had

years—there’s n0 reason t0 upend the apple cart now. The

this right

District

Court

should be reversed.

B.

The text 0f § 12-120(3) also supports attomevfee awards
0n unpaid service contracts.

Gepford purports
that

t0

ground

hjs interpretation the plain

language 0f the statute—asserting

Medical Recovery’s reading requires a statutory re-write. (Resp’t Br.

0n other grounds by

BECO

Const. C0.

v.

in actions t0 collect

at 28.)

J-U-B Engineers Ina, 149 Idaho

The opposite

is

294, 233 P.3d 1216

(2010).
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true.

Gepford and the lower coutts re-wrote the

Appeals held more than

thirty

commercial disputes” aid in

The

695, 778 P.2d at 817.

In any

civil

statute, not

years ago, the statute mandates fee shifting

“litigation

As

Medical Recovery.

in

the Coutt of

“certain non-

from commercial disputes.” Eriksen, 116 Idaho

arising

at

statute reads:

action to recover

on an open account, account stated,

negotiable instrume nt, guaranty, or contract relating
t0 the purchase 0r sale ofgoods,wares, me rchandise, orservices
note,

and

bill,

any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney‘s fee
to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
Idaho Code

§

in

12-120(3)

preposition “on”

and

later

(emphasis

The verb

added).

“in.”

by the preposition

transactions, allowing fees “to recover

See

“to recover”

id.

is

followed ﬁrst by the

“[O]n” modiﬁes the ﬁrst set 0f

on an open account, account

stated, note,

listed

negotiable

bill,

instrument, guaranty, or contract relating t0 the purchase 0r sale 0f goods, wares, merchandise, or

services.” 1d.

The

preposition

commercial transaction.”

Id.

“in”

The conjunctive

“commercial transaction” language
shifting.

modiﬁes the second category—suits “to recover

is

a second

“and” (highlighted

.

.

.

in

any

above) makes clear that the

added category 0f claims

eliglble

for statutory fee

Eriksen, 116 Idaho at 695, 778 P.2d at 817.
Gepford’s reading renders the second preposition “in” sutplusage.

statute’s expansive additive language:

intended to

limit

“and

in

any.” See Idaho

Code

It

also conflicts With the

§ 12—120(3). Ifthe Legislature

the scope 0f the statute, you’d expect a limiting phrase like “only in

transactions” rather than “and in any commercial transaction.”

See

commercial

id.

Thus, Gepford’s argument (adopted by the lower courts) creates surplusage and conflicts

with the statute’s plain langlage. This Court should reverse.Ada Cty. ProsecutingAttorney v. 2007

Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho
statute ‘must begin with the literal

351, 353, 298 P.3d 245, 247 (2013) (“The interpretation of a

words of the

APPELLANT’S AMENDED REPLY BRIEF
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statute; those

words must be given

their plain,

15

usual,

and ordinary meaning; and the

ambiguous,

Verska

v.

this

statute

Court does not construe

SaintAlphonsus Reg’lMed.

it,

Cm,

must be construed as a Whole.

If the statute

follows the law as written.

but simply

151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (201

not

(quoting

1)).

MEDICAL RECOVERY SHOULD BE GRANTED REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES 0N APPEAL.

III.

This Court

“may award reas onable attorney

reasonable amount of attorney

fees incurred in connection with the effort t0 secure a

fees.”BECO Constr. C0.

(2010), overruled 0n other grounds by

v.

Keybank Nat ’Z ASS ’n

J-U—B Eng’rs Ina, 149 Idaho

v.

PAL I, LLC,

(Eg. R.
,

84, 95, 98, 335),

and meets the

criteria for

Medical Recovery sued for payment 0f a debt, and

thjs

the prevailing party

services contract, the Court should grant Medical

§ 12- 120(3),

different provision 0f the statute: Idaho

§ 12-120(5), efforts t0 collect a judgment. (Resp’t Br. at 32.) This isn’t

As

Code

a statutory award offees, this Court should also grant

0n appeal. Gepford relies 0n a line 0f cases addressing a

fees in that underlying action.

294, 298

155 Idaho 287, 311 P.3d 299

(2013). Because Medic a1 Recovery prevailed below, sought attorney fees under Idaho

fees

999

is

ajudgment

Code

collection case.

appeal arises from the denial of attorney

on a claim

to recover

0n an unpaid medical

Recovery attorney fees on appeal. Idaho Code

§

12- 120(3).

CONCLUSION
Medical Recovery prevailed. As a prevailing party on a claim to recover an unpaid medical
services contract, Medical

Code

§ 12-120(3).

the reasonable

Recovery

is

entitled t0 costs as

The Court should reverse

right

the District Court

and attorney fees under Idaho

and remand

for determination of

amount 0f fees—both below and 0n appeal.
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